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One of the terms of reference of the Thirteenth Finance Commission (ThFC) calls upon the 
Finance Commission to look at ‘Measures needed to augment the consolidated fund of a State to 
supplement the resources of the Panchayats and Municipalities in the State on the basis of the 
recommendations made by the Finance Commission of the State’. In view of this, the present study 
examines issues related to fiscal federalism at the third tier in general and grants to local bodies in 
particular. It is well documented in the literature that the state of finances of local bodies, both 
urban and rural, displays a dismal picture in India. In contrast, the finances of the Central and State 
Governments are on a healthier track with the implementation of the rule based fiscal framework. 
The study opines that there is a need to fine tune the micro design of grants for local bodies (both 
urban and local) and their devolution across the States.  
The process of devolving funds to the local bodies based on the recommendations of the 
State Finance Commissions (SFCs) is not working efficiently in India. The issues in this area range 
from timing of setting up of SFCs to attitude of the State Governments to the recommendations of 
the SFCs. In this context, the study urges the ThFC to provide a uniform template for the SFCs 
along with a time line to make progress in the area. This would help the successive Finance 
Commissions to use the SFC reports as inputs for their recommendations.  
The study presents a normative framework to estimate the requirements of operation and 
maintenance (O&M) expenditure at the local body level based on three important public services i.e. 
water, education and roads. The study estimates a quantum jump in the local body grants from 
Rs.25,000 crore given by the Twelfth Finance Commission to Rs.94,451 crore during the award period 
of the ThFC. This would mean roughly 0.3 per cent of GDP per year. The study provides devolution 
formulae for distributing this amount among the State Governments. The aspects considered while 
designing the formula are share in O&M expenditure, fiscal capacity of the State Governments, 
population pressure on assets and inverse of asset density.  
The study makes suggestions with regard to supplementing the resource base of the local 
bodies (urban and local) such as making the local bodies grants unconditional, evenly distributing the 
grants to local bodies over the fiscal year in a predictable manner, providing an uniform template for 
SFCs, incentivizing State Governments for setting up of data warehouses for local bodies, 
constitution of a pool of fiscal experts for selection of SFC members, setting up an incentive fund 
for assisting the local bodies to access capital market and talking to local bodies directly until 
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If a man does not keep pace with his fellow companions; 
It is perhaps because he hears a different drummer. 
 
---- Henri Thoreau 
 




I.  Introduction 
The Thirteenth Finance Commission (ThFC) has been set up by the Presidential order 
and has begun its work in the right earnest. One of the terms of reference – of interest in the 
context of this study – calls upon the Finance Commission to look at ‘Measures needed to 
augment the consolidated fund of a State to supplement the resources of the Panchayats 
and Municipalities in the State on the basis of the recommendations made by the 
Finance Commission of the State’. In this context, the present study attempts to outline a 
framework which can strengthen decentralization at the third tier of the Government in India 
which has a constitutional status after the 73
rd and 74
th constitutional amendments in 1992. 
The study also attempts to estimate the grants to local bodies for the operation and 
maintenance expenditure and details how to distribute the grants among the State 
Governments, while leaving the responsibility to distribute the same among the local bodies 
with the respective State Governments. It may be noted that as per the term of reference of 
the Finance Commission, this has to be done on the basis of the inputs received from the 
State Finance Commission (SFC) reports. Thus, the study reviews the third SFC reports of 
few States which are publicly available to assess their usability as inputs for the 
recommendations of the ThFC related to the local body grants. The study also reviews the 
approaches of the previous Finance Commissions in regard to the local body grants to 
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understand how the question was handled in the past. As a relevant aside, the study also 
provides a backdrop of the state of finances at the State level and at the local body level. 
The study has five sections. Section II followed by introduction – by way of a 
preamble – sets out the parametric environment, in particular, the overall macroeconomic 
situation and the political scenario, which constitute the ‘relevant givens’ of the system and 
may be of interest to the ThFC in carrying out its task. Section III briefly traces the journey 
thus far in terms of the state of finances of the State Governments and local bodies and also 
reviews the SFC reports as well as the approaches followed by earlier Finance Commissions. 
Section IV presents a framework for strengthening decentralization at the third tier of 
Government in India, provides estimates of local body grants based on maintenance and 
operations requirements of three important services, i.e. water, education and roads and also 
attempts some devolution formulae for distributing the local body grants among the States.  
Section V summarizes the recommendations and concludes. 
II. Preamble 
The great Indian growth story and the nature of polity that currently exists in India are 
the two major defining factors of the parametric environment relevant to the ThFC while 
making its recommendations to strengthen decentralization. The recent upswing in the 
economic growth, with which the economy managed to significantly break away from the 
‘Hindu rate’, has had positive impact on the macro-level fiscal and income variables at the 
Centre and State levels. As a result, the affordability of the Indian economy to bring in more 
inclusion in all the social spheres has gone up significantly. This presumes significance in the 
context of the existence of an exclusionary sub-plot to the growth story. At the macro level, 
this sub-plot is displayed in terms of the stagnant economies of the poorer States and at the 
micro level by the depressing standard of living of some of the sections of population and the 
sluggish development of some sectors. Thus, with the new opportunities opened up by the 
growth momentum, this is an opportune time for the policy makers to ensure that all the 
policy efforts have inclusion at its soul. To make inclusion plausible, greater attention needs 
to be paid to the rural sector of the economy (farm and non-farm) with more focus on core 
services such as water, education, roads, health and power. Further, it is crucial that the 
economic growth, even though it is exclusionary in character, has to be sustained. This is 
important for increasing the distributable resources in the economy. Thus, along with  
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including the excluded, attention needs to be paid to the better performing States and sectors 
to make the policy strategy compatible with incentives. 
Although India has a federal structure albeit not in the classical sense (see Roy, 2007), 
it is essentially an Union with a strong centripetal bias with the constitution ensuring an 
overwhelming and overriding power to the Central Government. However, over the decades 
the nature of polity has undergone a dramatic change from single party domination to 
coalitional politics. The regional parties with their local agendas have gained substantial 
bargaining power at the national level in this new era of coalitional politics. Or in other 
words, the bargaining power of the States ruled by these regional parties have gone up under 
the coalitional political set up. This is important in the context of decentralization because 
most of the important public goods - such as education, health, water, roads – are largely 
provided by States and below. Thus, under the present political set up, the States are in a 
better position to demand more funds from the Central Government.  
These political developments can bring in more progress on the front of 
empowerment of local bodies. This belief is supported by a couple of hazy propositions about 
the link between political structure and decentralization. First, Central Government is far 
more pro-decentralization (including financial devolution) than the State level Government. 
As far as the Central Government is concerned, the disutility arising out of sharing resources 
(economic and political) with others is invariant to whether the sharing takes place with one 
or more sub-national governments. Instead, for the State Governments it matters how much it 
actually devolves to lower level. Second, regional parties would – ceterus paribus – be more 
inclined to decentralization. More specifically, political parties which derive their strength 
from regional agenda (which are necessarily people-touching and participatory) and generally 
parties that are cadre based are more positive about decentralization. This is because the party 
structure continues to be prominent whether the party is in office or out of it, thus official/ 
elected positions do not grant sufficient powers to provide a threat to higher level 
functionaries (in office as well as the party). Finally, coalitional government at the central 
level – especially with one national and others essentially with regional identification – will 
augur well for an effective big push towards effective decentralization. These then, are the 
reasons for our seemingly sanguine hope and assertion for higher level of devolution to the 




III.  The Journey Thus Far 
This section traces the journey thus far in terms of three important requisites for 
decentralization such as the state finances, the Finance Commissions (State and Union) and 
the financial condition of local bodies. The implication of each of these to the status of and 
the demand on, the consolidated fund of the State is too obvious to require elaboration. 
III.1     State Finances 
  The context here is provided by enactment of Fiscal Responsibility Legislations 
(FRLs) by the Centre and States (26 so far) and how to improve the state finances further 
keeping in view that one needs to fine tune the performance of the States. We take off from 
the mid-eighties when the fiscal stress on the States was rather pronounced. 
There has been a severe fiscal stress in respect of finances of State Governments since 
the mid-eighties. The fiscal stress emanated from inadequacy of receipts in meeting the 
expenditure requirements. The low and declining buoyancies in tax and non-tax receipts, 
constraints on internal resources mobilization due to losses incurred by State Public Sector 
Undertakings and decelerating resource transfer from Centre contributed to worsening of 
State finances. Following the reform measures introduced in 1991, the State Governments 
adopted fiscal adjustment resulting in improvement of consolidated fiscal position of the 
States as reflected in the major deficit indicators for the period 1990-95 (award period of 9
th 
Finance Commission).  But the trend reversed shortly thereafter largely on account of fall in 
tax buoyancy, decline in transfer from the Centre, slowdown in PSU restructuring and 
continuation of uneconomical user charges. The implementation of award of the Central Fifth 
Pay Commission by the State Governments for their employees added to the fiscal 




 In recent years, State finances have witnessed a noticeable improvement with all but 
two States (Sikkim and West Bengal) operating under a rule based framework in terms of 
FRLs enacted by them (Misra and Khundrakpam, 2008). The consolidated revenue balance of 
the State Government is approaching surplus mode while the gross fiscal deficit is contained 
below 3 per cent of GDP (Table 1).  
Table 1: Trends in Deficit Indicators 
           (Rs. crore)
Item  1990-95  1995-00  2000-05 2005-06  2006-07 2007-08 2005-08 
 (Avg.)  (Avg.)  (Avg.) (Accounts) (RE) (BE)  (Avg.)
RD 5,330  28,400  55,091 7,013 5,566 -11,973  202
 (0.7)  (1.7)  (2.2) (0.2) (0.1) -(0.3)  (0.0)
GFD 21,250 54,860  102,063 90,084 113,913 108,323  104,107
 (2.8)  (3.4)  (4.0) (2.5) (2.7) (2.3)  (2.5)
PD 7,646  23,439  32,378 6,060 18,209 5,648  9,972
   (1.1)  (1.4)  (1.3) (0.2) (0.4) (0.1)  (0.2)
RD: Revenue Deficit  GFD: Gross Fiscal Deficit   
PD: Primary Deficit  BE: Budget Estimates   
RE: Revised Estimates        Avg.: Average   
Note: Figures in brackets are percentage to GDP.   
Source: Budget Documents of State Governments.        
A crucial issue is that whether the fiscal correction during recent years has been 
revenue led or on account of expenditure compression/rationalization. On the revenue side, 
the States have two sources, i.e., own revenue (tax and non-tax) and devolution and transfers 
from the Centre (share in Central taxes and grants-in-aid). The revenue receipts of the States  
 
10
as a ratio to GDP have moved up to about 12.8 per cent of GDP in the recent years from 
below 12.0 per cent of GDP in the earlier periods (Table 2). The revenue enhancement of the 
States has been largely facilitated by devolution and transfers from the Centre through 
shareable taxes and grants-in-aid based on recommendations of the Twelfth Finance 
Commission (TFC). Improved macroeconomic fundamentals also aided the process. The own 
tax revenue as a ratio to GDP also moved up, albeit slowly, to reach more than 6.0 per cent of 
GDP in recent years compared to about 5.5 per cent of GDP in earlier years largely on 
account of implementation of value added tax (VAT) by the States. There has been, however, 
decline in own non-tax revenue of the States relative to GDP.  
Table 2: Trends in Revenue Receipts                                 
     (Rs. crore)
Item  1990-  95  1995-00 2000-05 2005-06  2006-07  2007-08 2005-08
 (Avg.)  (Avg.) (Avg.) (Accounts) (RE)  (BE) (Avg.)
RR (1 + 2)  92,679 165,416 285,661 431,021 531,429 606,733 523,061
  (12.0) (10.7) (11.2) (12.0) (12.8) (12.9) (12.6)
1. OR (a +b)  55,546  103,542 178,171 260,247 312,738  353,229 308,738
  (7.2) (6.7) (7.0) (7.3) (7.5) (7.5) (7.4)
     a. OTR  41,158  78,733 141,933 212,307 257,080  294,038 254,475
  (5.3) (5.1) (5.6) (5.9) (6.2) (6.3) (6.1)
        Of  which:             
  Sales tax/VAT  24,238  47,317 86,008 128,769 158,113  182,973 156,618
  (3.1) (3.0) (3.4) (3.6) (3.8) (3.9) (3.8)
      b. ONTR  14,388  24,809 36,238 47,939 55,657  59,191 54,263
  (1.8) (1.6) (1.4) (1.3) (1.3) (1.3) (1.3)
2. CT (a + b)  37,133  61,874 107,491 170,774 218,691  253,504 214,323
  (4.8) (4.0) (4.2) (4.8) (5.3) (5.4) (5.1)
      a. SCT  19,790  37,608 61,047 94,024 115,737  136,184 115,315
  (2.6) (2.4) (2.4) (2.6) (2.8) (2.9) (2.8)
      b. Grants  17,343  24,267 46,444 76,750 102,955  117,320 99,008
    (2.3) (1.6) (1.8) (2.1) (2.5) (2.5) (2.4)
RR: Revenue Receipts  OR: Own Revenue    VAT: Value Added Tax 
OTR: Own Tax Revenue  CT: Current Transfers  SCT: Share in Central Taxes 
ONTR: Own Non-Tax Revenue      BE: Budget Estimates 
Note: Figures in brackets are percentage to GDP.    RE: Revised Estimates 
Source: Budget Documents of State Governments.   Avg.: Average. 
Total expenditure of State Governments had moved up from the average level of 15.9 
per cent of GDP in first half of 1990s to 17.1 per cent of GDP in first half of 2000s.  The ratio 
has started declining in recent years primarily on account of reduction in revenue  
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expenditure.  Expenditure rationalization of the States has not been easy with several non-
discretionary components such as interest payments, pension and administrative services.   
With increase in the fiscal deficits and rise in interest cost, interest payments as a ratio to 
GDP went up gradually from 1.7 per cent during 1990-95 to 2.7 per cent in 2000-05. It has 
come down to around 2.2 per cent of GDP in recent years, primarily due to the Debt Swap 
Scheme (2002-05) and Debt Consolidation and Relief Facility recommended by the TFC.  
Pension payments have moved up sharply during 2000s compared to 1990s; it, however, 
stabilized around 1 per cent of GDP in recent years.  There was decline in level of 
development expenditure of States to about 9.4 per cent of GDP during 1995-2005 from 10.7 
per cent of GDP during 1990-95.  Presently the ratio is hovering around 10.0 per cent.  One 
distinguishing development is the rise in capital outlay to about 2.5 per cent of GDP in recent 


















Table 3: Trend in Expenditure 
          (Rs.  crore)
Item 1990-95  1995-00 2000-05 2005-06  2006-07  2007-08 2005-08














 (15.9)  (14.9) (17.1) (15.7) (16.6)  (16.3) (16.2)
of  which:            













 (12.7)  (12.4) (13.4) (12.2) (13.0)  (12.7) (12.6)
       of which:            
 Interest Payments  13,605  31,421 69,685 84,024 95,704  102,675 94,134
 (1.7)  (2.0) (2.7) (2.3) (2.3)  (2.2) (2.3)
 Pension  4,588  13,617 30,816 40,648 47,739  54,263 47,550
 (0.6)  (0.8) (1.2) (1.1) (1.2)  (1.2) (1.1)
Administrative Services  9,172  17,525 27,718 34,298 42,511  49,066 41,958
 (1.2)  (1.1) (1.1) (1.0) (1.0)  (1.0) (1.0)













 (1.5)  (1.4) (1.6) (2.2) (2.5)  (2.5) (2.4)
Memo item:            
Development 
Expenditure 81,989  145,852 239,576 330,044 419,050  467,696 405,597
 (10.7)  (9.4) (9.4) (9.2) (10.1)  (10.0) (9.8)
Social Sector 
Expenditure  44,690 85,823 139,612 189,430 244,241  275,590 236,420
   (5.8)  (5.5) (5.5) (5.3) (5.9)  (5.9) (5.7)
Avg.: Average  BE: Budget Estimates   
Note: Figures in brackets are percentage to GDP.   RE: Revised Estimates   
Source: Budget Documents of State Governments.  
 
Thus, it can be seen that the fiscal situation of the States presents a healthier picture as 
compared to the one that presented itself at the onset of the TFC. As Karnik (2005) in one of 
the commentaries noted, ‘We are afraid that the report of Twelfth FC, while it is critical of 
current situation of State finances is rather sanguine about future prospects’. Kelkar (2004) 
clearly believes that it is much better to concentrate on revenue raising effort with its 
powerful side effect of strengthening State finances which is not the consequence of 
expenditure cuts.  
The growth dividend in the form of tax revenue buoyancy has clearly had good effect 
on the fiscal situation of the States. The expenditure as a ratio to GDP has, however, been  
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stabilizing. The outstanding liabilities have increased, though as a per cent to GDP, it has 
witnessed a declining trend during the recent years. The revenue buoyancy, reduction of 
compulsory borrowings from the NSSF to 80 per cent along with the Central schemes such as 
debt swap scheme and the debt consolidation and relief facility helped the State Governments 
to keep the interest payments at about 16 per cent of revenue receipts on an average. 
However, the increasing trend in the rate of interest on market loans during the recent years 
may dim the picture in future. It may be mentioned that the introduction of VAT provided a 
new momentum to the revenue collection at the State level, with the help of which the State 
Governments are on track with the targets set out in the respective FRLs.   
In this context, the implications of holding the cap of revenue deficit for expenditure 
on the crucial sectors such as health and education will require to be watched closely. Much 
ingenuity – by way of micro-design – in neutralizing the negative impact on the ‘good’ 
revenue expenditure in this area will have to be exercised by the ThFC. Thus, further 
refinements are called for in the on-going fiscal correction and consolidation process so as to 
‘sensibly’ impose micro-caps so that the State finances are buoyant and healthier. This will 
lead to augmentation of the consolidated fund of the States which will endow them with a 
greater capability for onward transfers to the local bodies.  
III.2 Finance  Commissions 
  The theoretical efficiency and welfare gains to be made from decentralization are well 
established for some time now (see e.g. Tiebout, 1961 and Oates, 1972). However, one needs 
to be mindful of the institutional and administrative capacity constraints among other things 
that undermine the actual operational aspects of decentralization (see e.g. Tanzi, 1996 and 
Prud’homme, 1995). It then follows that in countries like India that do not face serious 
macroeconomic crisis, decentralization of revenues and expenditure will require the active 
engagement of the Central Government, both for management reasons as well as for directing 
concerted and coordinated efforts towards attaining national goals. The Finance Commissions 
derive their importance in this context. Apart from the State Governments, the spirit of 73
rd 
and 74
th Constitutional amendments required simultaneous transfer of functions as well as 
empowerment of the local governments. The finance, functions and functionaries have to be 
completely on board for the Constitutional Amendment Act to be meaningfully implemented. 
Finance Commissions are a progeny of the constitution and have performed their 
functions so far in a manner that has earned them a reputation (especially the Central Finance  
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Commissions) for conducting their duty with utmost integrity and not being easily swayed by 
the partisan political considerations. The State Finance Commissions are relatively of recent 
origin. They have been constitutionally mandated only about fifteen years ago and continue 
to be beset with problems. Their awards do not seem to attract the same respect when it 
comes to either acceptance or indeed implementation. In the following sub-sections we look 
at the issues related to the SFCs and the relevant treatment reported in the last three Central 




III.2.1 State Finance Commissions 
We reviewed the SFC Reports, their awards, acceptance and implementation with a 
view to judge their utility to serve as inputs to Central Finance Commission award. This is a 
huge area which has been widely researched (see e.g., World Bank/ Geeta Sethi, 2004, India 
Infrastructure Report, 2003 and Shubham Chaudhary, 2007). However, the public domain 
knowledge about these reports continues to be woefully sparse. The SFCs have been required 
by the constitutional mandate as a part of the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts. 
There are only few States that have rigorously kept to a time table of setting up SFCs. The 
timing of setting SFCs up have also not been synchronized with the CFCs, thus, depriving 
CFCs of the crucial inputs as envisaged. The newly formed States are only initiating the 
process of setting up their first SFC (Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand and Jharkhand). The status of 
the SFCs of the different State Governments is given in Appendices I(a) and I(b). Though the 
SFCs have mostly been set up rather mechanically, not much thought seems to have gone into 
the exercise in the composition of the SFCs, especially from the view point of inherent 
expertise.  
The quality of the SFC reports in different States shows heterogeneity. Some of the 
SFCs have recommended revenue (tax and non-tax) (Andhra Pradesh) and sometimes only 
the tax measures (Assam), shares to be devolved as well as the sharing between the urban and 
rural local bodies. The inter se distribution between the different tiers is also recommended 
based on criteria that vary from simple and straight forward to complicated and detailed/ 
formula based formats that reflect social concerns. Some of the SFC reports have gone to the 
extent of working out first level demarcation in terms of advanced, ordinary and backward 
local bodies along with weights. Recommendations about assignments of taxes such as taxes 
on advertisement, profession and property have routinely been made. In addition, some SFCs  
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have suggested newer revenue handles to the local bodies and improvement in the efficiency 
of the existing ones. Some have recommended (and implemented) special grants for weak 
PRIs as well as incentive grants for well performing ones (e.g., Haryana, Punjab, 
Maharashtra). However, it is difficult to justify the efforts taken by the SFCs resulting in ad-
hoc, non-formulaic and paltry grants being handed down to the local bodies. 
It can be seen that some of the SFCs have taken their job seriously and come up with 
useful recommendations. However, by and large, most of these recommendations have been 
rejected and when they have been accepted in principle, the States have dragged their feet in 
the matter of actual implementation of the awards. Fewer still have actually gone through the 
process of acceptance and Action Taken Report (ATR) by the respective governments and 
legislatures. It is surprising to note that even several years have passed after the submission of 
reports, States in their response to the query use phrases like ‘accepted in principle’, or ‘under 
active consideration’, or ‘yet to be ascertained’ (Assam, Tripura and Goa) or indeed the more 
drastic, ‘details are not available’ (Maharashtra). In most cases the conditional acceptance 
means non-acceptance of recommendations that have financial implications.  
Obviously, there are exceptions wherein not only the recommendations have been 
accepted but actual implementation and quick releases of funds have happened (Gujarat, 
Haryana, Sikkim and Punjab). In a rare case, Haryana has released advanced grants rather than 
awaiting for the report of the next FC. Several new schemes have been initiated with strides in 
implementation backed by financial releases is another best practice that is reported. This 
shows the proactive stance of the State which should be considered a good practice especially 
in contrast to the generally prevalent attitude of finding excuses or shifting blame.  
In some States such as Jammu and Kashmir and Orissa, parallel bodies such as the 
Halqua Panchayats and Pani-panchayats, respectively are responsible for devolving funds. 
While they may be doing good work whether such parallel bodies are to be allowed is a moot 
point. Quantum of aggregate and specific schematic funds that reaches each Panchayat is as 
high as 20 to 30 per cent in some cases (Himachal Pradesh and Kerala). The enabling practice 
in some States of allowing outsourcing especially in technical matters and mandate to raise 
resources through borrowings is a good practice that deserves emulation. The transfer of 
rights for extraction of minerals whilst keeping the revenues is another good practice worth 
mentioning (Madhya Pradesh). The study of a few third SFC reports that are available show a 
natural progression. Although they continue to lament the lack of reliable data, they have  
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come up with detailed (formulaic) recommendations (Rajasthan). Some good practices with 
regards to process and quantum of flow of funds are undoubtedly in evidence, but these are 
largely in States that have already been converted to the dharma of decentralization. 
However, the role of SFCs in converting the significant majority of other States is non-
existent. Thus, it is clear from the above review that the SFCs as an instrument of devolution 
of funds seem to have been a singular failure and there is no way that the CFC will be in a 
position to take the inputs from SFC recommendations as inputs.  
This cannot continue and the ThFC must create a template that could be 
recommended to all the states. This should detail the data requirement and provide formulaic 
boxes that all the SFCs must use (with perhaps differing weights duly justified). As in the 
case of the manner of transfer of funds to the lower governments, the ‘best practices’ needs to 
be documented and other States should be encouraged to emulate. Perhaps the centripetal bias 
of our federation needs to be invoked to take concrete steps (including constitutional 
amendment) to force the issue of empowering properly constituted SFCs, who would in their 
turn become agents of real change.  
III.2.2 Earlier Central Finance Commissions 
In this section we provide a bird’s eye-view of the approach followed by earlier 
Central Finance Commissions. We look at the Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Finance 
Commission Reports – recommendations and methodologies particularly related to 
strengthening of the local bodies. By and large, the treatment by the different Finance 
Commissions has been ad-hoc, however each successive FC has brought something new to 
the table. The constraints are fairly obvious and how to circumvent these is a major problem 
facing the Central Finance Commissions. The tabular form presentation that follows is self 
explanatory (Table 4). 
Table 4: Central Finance Commissions and Local Bodies 






Terms of reference 
relating to local 
bodies 
- To  make 
recommendations on the 
measures needed to 
augment the 
Consolidated Funds of 
the States to supplement 
the resources of the 
To make 
recommendations on the 
measures needed to 
augment the 
Consolidated Funds of 
the States to supplement 
the resources of the  
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panchayats and the 
municipalities on the 
basis of the 
recommendations of the 
State Finance 
Commissions (SFCs).  
panchayats and the 
municipalities on the 
basis of the 
recommendations of the 
State Finance 
Commissions (SFCs). 
Recommendations   Recommended Rs.100 
per capita for rural 
population as per the 
1971 census for the 
panchayats and Rs.1,000 
crore for the 
municipalities for the 
five year period covered 
by the finance 
commission.   
Recommended a total 
grant of Rs.1,600 crore 
for the panchayats and 
Rs.400 crore for the 
municipalities for each of 
the five years starting 
from the financial year 
2000-01. 
Recommended a sum of 
Rs.25,000 crore for the 
period 2005-10 as grants-
in-aid to augment the 
consolidated fund of the 
States to supplement the 
resources of the 
municipalities and the 
panchayats. This amount 
may be divided between 
the panchayats and the 
municipalities in the ratio 
of 80:20, i.e., Rs.20,000 
crore for the PRIs and 
Rs.5,000 crore for the 
municipalities.  
Criteria for 
distribution of grant 
among States 
The amount 
recommended for the 
urban local bodies has to 
be distributed amongst 
the States on the basis of 
the inter-state ratio of 
slum population derived 
from urban population 
figures as per 1971 
census.  
 
•  Population – 40 per 
cent 
•  Index of 
decentralization – 20 
per cent 
•  Distance from highest 
per capita income – 
20 per cent 
•  Revenue effort – 10 
per cent 
•  Geographical area – 
10 per cent 
 
•  Population – 40 per 
cent 
•  Geographical area – 10 
per cent 
•  Distance from highest 
per capita income 
– 20 per cent 
•  Index of Deprivation – 
10 per cent 
•  Revenue effort – 20 
per cent 
of which 
•  with respect to own 
revenue of states 
– 10 per cent 
•  with respect to GSDP 
– 10 per cent 
Conditions   •  These amounts should 
be additionality over 
and above the amounts 
flowing to the local 
bodies from State 
Governments.  
•  The State 
Governments were 
•  These amounts should 
be over and above the 
normal flow of funds 
to the local bodies 
from the States and the 
amounts that would 
flow from the 
implementation of SFC 
•  Of the grants allocated 
for panchayats, priority 
should be given to 
expenditure on the 
O&M costs of water 
supply and sanitation. 
•  At least 50 per cent of 
the grants-in-aid  
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required to prepare 
suitable schemes with 
detailed guidelines for 
the utilization of the 
grants.  
•  The local bodies 
should be required to 
provide suitable 
matching contributions 
by raising resources.  
•  The grant is not 
intended for 
expenditure on salaries 
and wages.  
 
recommendations 
•  The amounts indicated 
for maintenance of 
accounts and audit and 
for development of 
database, would be the 
first charge on the 
grant recommended by 
EFC and would be 
released by the 
concerned Ministries 
of the Government of 
India, after the 
arrangements 




should be utilized for 
maintenance of core 
civic services by the 
local bodies, on the 
principles indicated in 
the EFC report.  
provided to each State 
for the urban local 
bodies should be 
earmarked for the 




•  States may assess the 
requirement of each 
local body in building 
data base and 
maintenance of 
accounts and earmark 
funds accordingly out 
of the total allocation 
recommended by TFC. 
•  It is for the State 
concerned to distribute 
the grants 
recommended for the 
State among the local 
bodies including those 
in the excluded areas 
in a fair and just 
manner.  
•  No conditionality over 
and above those 
recommended by TFC 





Source: Central Finance Commission Reports.  
 
Thus, whilst the successive CFCs have been trying to do their bit to put the finances 
of the local bodies on firmer foundation, they need help from three fronts. The States must 
devolve more funds, the local bodies must be enabled to raise more revenue and the SFCs 
must be accorded their rightful esteem so that their awards can, inter alia, provide useful 





III.3  Finances of Local Bodies 
It may be mentioned that during early 2000s, the local bodies revenue accounted for 
around 1.75 per cent of GDP with Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) accounting for about 0.75 per 
cent of GDP and PRIs accounting for 1.0 per cent of GDP.  
III.3.1 Urban Local Bodies 
  The state of ULBs in India is slightly better as a whole compared to the Panchayati 
Raj Institutions (PRIs). Here too there is a great deal of heterogeneity with some doing rather 
well (especially the Municipal Corporations) whilst others smaller municipal councils 
increasing their dependency on the higher governments even to deliver the core local public 
goods and services. This is explained by the fact that the Indian economic growth in recent 
times has been driven by urban areas and with reforms some of the ULBs have been able to 
help themselves improve their situation. There have been comprehensive studies in this 
sphere (see Pethe and Lalvani 2005, 2006 as well as Mohanty et al, 2007 to mention a few) 
and so we shall be rather brief in our treatment here. 
As per the TFC Report, India has as many as 3,723 Urban Local Bodies (ULBs), of 
which 109 are Municipal Corporations, 1432 are Municipalities and 2182 are Nagar 
Panchayats. The major sources of revenues of the urban local bodies include taxes on 
property, profession, vehicles, advertisement, lighting, pilgrim, entertainment, etc. Presently, 
property tax at the municipal level is not tapped to the full extent. However, it may be noted 
that property tax is a promising revenue source for the urban local bodies considering the 
expansion of cities with accelerating house construction and increasing project value. It can 
be made a more buoyant revenue source in future by switching over to the capital-value 
based system from the existing ratable-value system (Pethe, et.al., 2004). The total revenue of 
the ULBs rose from Rs.11,515 crore in 1998-99 to Rs.15,149 crore in 2001-02 accounting for 
about 0.75 per cent of GDP of the country.  Municipal revenue forms a small proportion of 
the State, Central and Combined State and Central Government revenues. It has marginally 















Relative share of Total Municipal Revenue 
(as per cent of Total Revenue of) 




1990-91 3,931  0.73 5.91 7.15  3.71
1998-99 11,515  0.73 4.38 5.84  2.50
1999-00 13,173  0.75 4.24 4.42  2.46
2000-01 14,581  0.77 4.17 4.48  2.43
2001-02  15,149 0.73 4.05 4.18  2.33
Source: (i) Reports of Eleventh and Twelfth Finance Commission  
              (ii) Economic Survey, GoI, 2004-05. 
 
        It is important to analyse the trends in finances of the ULBs in the recent past.  On 
revenue side, own revenue of the ULBs constitutes 60 per cent of total revenue receipts, and, 
on expenditure side, revenue expenditure constitutes 75 per cent of total expenditure.  The 
relative share of own revenue vis-à-vis other revenue declined by about 2 percentage points 
during 1998-99 to 2001-02, thus increasing the level of dependency of local bodies on State 
Governments.  During this period, the share of capital expenditure has been less than one-
fourth of the total expenditure with a declining trend. However, there is one healthy trend. 
Municipal bodies as a whole are in revenue surplus, i.e., revenue receipts are exceeding 














Table 6: Revenue and Expenditure of ULBs in India     
                                                                                                                                   (Rs. crore) 
Item 1998-99  1999-00  2000-01  2001-02 
Revenue        
Total Revenue (i+ii)  11514.63 13172.96 14581.05  15149.20
(i) Own Revenue (a+b)    6873.42 7379.85 8260.52  8760.16
Share of Own Revenue  in Total Revenue 
(per cent) 
59.69 56.02 56.65 57.83
(a) Tax Revenue  4755.52 5151.01 5617.57  5885.81
(b) Non-Tax Revenue  2117.90 2228.84 2642.95  2874.35
(ii) Other Revenue (a+b+c)  4641.21 5793.11 6320.53  6389.04
Share Other Revenue  in Total Revenue 
(per cent) 
40.31 43.98 43.35 42.17
(a) Assignment & Devolution  2208.32 2646.60 2981.84  2744.63
(b)Grants-in-Aid 1807.86 2251.21 2239.24  2671.65
(c) Others    625.03 895.30 1099.45  972.76
Expenditure   
Total Expenditure (i+ii) 
12034.94 14451.66 15743.05 15914.29
(i) Revenue Expenditure 
9059.47 10690.30 11665.88 12204.78
Share of Revenue Expenditure  in Total 
Expenditure (per cent)  75.28 73.97 74.10 76.69
(ii) Capital Expenditure  2975.47 3761.36 4077.17 3709.51
Share of Capital Expenditure in Total 
Expenditure (per cent)  24.72 26.03 25.90 23.31
Source: Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission. 
  
It may be noted that whereas the state of fiscal health of large Municipal Corporations 
is reasonable, the smaller urban local bodies are generally in a bad shape. They are not too 
differently placed as compared to some of the PRIs and need the same kind of succor if they 
have to be strengthened and allowed to stand on their own feet so that they may provide local 
public goods and services efficiently and effectively given the number of services they are 
mandated to deliver (Appendix  II).  
In sum, we may say that the financial-position of many of the urban local bodies is far 
from good. However recognizing this does not take us far, except to say that ‘more ought to 
be devolved’. The point is that in relative terms, some of the local bodies (urban and rural) 
are reasonable enough so that we could exploit this fact to enable them, to singly or  
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collectively access financial markets. This alone will help them garner the tremendous 
amount of resources they require for financing their infrastructure requirements. We now turn 
to Panchayat Raj Institutions. 
 
III.3.2 Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRIs) 
Panchayat Raj Institutions are large in number distributed across the country. There 
are  2,43,685 PRIs in India of which 2,36,350 are Gram/Village Panchayats (including 
Village Councils & Boards), 6,795 are Panchayat Samities, 531 are Zilla Panchayats and 9 
are Autonomous District Councils (Report of TFC, 2004).  
As per the Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, agriculture including 
agriculture extension, animal husbandry, minor irrigation, land reforms, fisheries, rural 
housing, drinking water, rural roads, rural electrification and primary and secondary school 
education are some of the important functions of the PRIs (Appendix III). The major sources 
of the revenue of the PRIs constitute profession tax, entertainment tax, taxes on residential 
buildings and property, tolls on roads, advertisement tax, etc. It is well documented in the 
literature that the state of finances of the PRIs portrays a dismal picture in India
1 (Oommen, 
2005, Agarwal (2005), Goel and Rajneesh (2003), Rao and Rao (2008).  
It may be noted that most of the tax revenue sources assigned to the panchayat raj 
institutions have very low tax bases coupled with low buoyancies. A recent study by Pethe 
and Lalvani (2008) documents that a decade after the path breaking Constitutional 
Amendment Acts, own revenues (per capita) still form a mere 9 per cent of the total 
expenditure (per capita) of the PRIs. The revenue receipts of panchayat raj institutions are 
given in Table 7 and the per capita revenue and expenditure of the PRIs (15 major States) are 






                                                 
1 Data on rural local bodies in the various States are available from the CFCs both 11
th and 12
th FCs. However, 
this data set needs to be used cautiously. A few studies (Govinda Rao, 2007 and Oommen, 2005) have drawn 
attention to several examples to explain why they find the data set to be suspect.  
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Table 7: Revenue Significance of Panchayat Raj Institutions 
         (Rs.crore) 
   Total   Percentage
Relative share of Total Panchayat 
Revenue 
Year Panchayat  of  GDP  (as per cent of Total Revenue of): 
  Revenue   
State 
Govt. Central  Govt.  Combined 
        State and 
               Central 
1998-99  17,296 0.99 10.0 11.6 6.0 
1999-00  22,264 1.14 11.0 12.3 6.5 
2000-01  23,244 1.11 10.0 12.1 6.1 
2001-02  22,470 0.99 9.0 11.2 5.6 
2002-03  24,011 0.98 8.8 10.4 5.3 
Source: Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission.   
 
Table 8: Key Indicators of Panchayat Raj Institutions (15 Major States) 
(in Per Capita Terms)                              

















1993-94  3.13 9.21 160.91 158.51 4466.66 4573.31  N.A.
1994-95  3.75 10.87 178.42 167.69 5190.48 4797.91  N.A.
1995-96  4.18 11.80 203.46 202.32 5550.55 4681.05  N.A.
1996-97  4.79 12.62 247.66 238.88 6390.17 4986.09  N.A.




4.22 11.67 218.64 212.56 5664.44 4776.94 
 
 1998-99    15.28 28.11 306.70 318.79 7459.26 4975.00  166.03
 1999-00    15.86 31.62 382.41 373.07 7674.06 4881.51  212.70
 2000-01    17.66 33.06 403.51 404.27 8438.17 4830.20  220.82
 2001-02    18.87 32.90 380.37 394.55 8627.50 5035.47  211.23




17.65 32.55 375.65 378.08 8163.27 4877.53  206.77
N.A.: Not Available.  
Note: GSDPP: GSDP from Primary Sector; GSDPPR: GSDP from Primary Sector at 
constant 93/94 prices 
States= Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya 
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, West 
Bengal  




The study by Pethe and Lalvani (2008) also opined that the average PRI own revenues 
are below 1 per cent of the States’ own revenue for fifteen major states and PRIs depend on 
upper tiers to the extent of 77.0 per cent.  Thus the broad story that emerges is clear – despite 
the much spoken about decentralization de facto fiscal empowerment of rural local bodies has 
moved at snails’ pace. Further, it may be noted that the shares allocated to various States by 
the TFC from the funds set aside for PRIs does not seem to be in consonance with the 
incremental performance of these States in the arena of fiscal decentralization (Pethe and 
Lalvani, 2008). The classification of States as per fiscal decentralization and buoyancy is 
given in Table 9. Only five States appear in the ‘good’ category both in terms of their ranks 
in fiscal decentralization and buoyancy.  
 
Table 9: The Good and Not Good Matrix 
 
FISCAL DECENTRALISATION GRAND RANK 






























         Source: Pethe and Lalvani, 2008. 
 
Thus, the key indicators suggest that while there has been some progress in terms of 
increase in own sources of revenue, it has been very slow and the PRIs continue to depend 
heavily on the upper tiers of government for their expenditure. It is also seen that the good 
behavior on the part of the States yield benefits in terms of improved buoyancy and hence a 





IV.  Core: What can the Thirteenth Finance Commission do? 
We recommend a bouquet approach for the empowerment of local bodies through 
enablement, transfers encompassing incentive structure and loan/bond exposure (pooled 
finance enablement). We are of the view that as far as the local body grant is concerned, the 
ThFC may concentrate on the operations and maintenance (O&M) requirements of the local 
bodies which is a major fiscal lacuna at the local body level. In the present study, we have 
concentrated on the O&M requirements of the local bodies on water, education and roads, 
mainly due to data and other constraints. The ThFC may consider expanding the coverage by 
including other relevant sectors. The ThFC may suggest a uniform template for the SFCs so 
that their reports can be used by the successive Finance Commissions, may incentivise the 
States to develop data warehouses for the local bodies and may also incentivise the local 
bodies to access the capital market as a group.  
IV.1   Strengthening Decentralization – Some Qualitative Suggestions 
In principle, decentralization was seen to be unanimously acceptable, yet at the real 
ground level the States have not decentralized in the true sense. Local bodies have been 
treated as ‘creatures’ of the States rather than as those of the constitution. Hence the States 
having devolved the functions, have shied away from devolving either the requisite resources 
in a predictable and certain manner or indeed enabled the local governments (especially in 
case of urban bodies) by vesting them with sufficient legislative powers to raise resources. 
The 73
rd and 74
th amendment do not go far enough to bring in the decentralization in its full 
sense owing to the discretion with the State Governments that they ‘may’ rather than ‘shall’ 
transfer the resources to the local Government level. In this context, the work of Ministries 
such as Ministry of Panchayat Raj (MoPR) in trying to transfer the resources directly through 
treasury and banks is note-worthy. Further, it may also be noted that the local bodies have 
also by and large not fully exploited the potential possibilities to help their cause.  
The CFC can strengthen decentralization in two ways. First, incentivize the States to 
decentralize more through its recommendations. This can be done by including a ‘measure of 
decentralization’ in the inter se devolution formula for statutory tax transfers so that States 
that are decentralizing would receive a reward and nudge others to follow suit. The States 
may decentralize more on two accounts (i) by transferring more resources to the local 
governments and (ii) by handing over more revenue handles to the local Government. In this  
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context, we wish to suggest a two pronged approach. First, the obligatory tax handles have to 
be seriously implemented along with the floor rates prescribed in a mandatory manner. For 
example the issue of property tax for ULBs and the issues of agricultural levies for PRIs, as 
suggested by Rajaraman (2007) amongst others, will have to be faced. There are two things 
to be mentioned here. One, that some of the ‘local taxes’ that collected by the State need to be 
fully transmitted to the local bodies and two, exploitation of such taxes as land revenues, and 
Property Taxes must be made mandatory with specified ‘floors’. Proper design of incentives 
for such effort is necessary (with implication for design of statutory transfers) and will help 
expand the fiscal base of the local bodies so that the trade-off between efficiency and equity 
is carefully worked out. It is well worth emphasizing that we are not advocating use of 
incentive grant for effort by the local bodies or indeed for decentralization just yet when it 
comes to devolution to local bodies. Apart from granting greater taxation powers to the local 
bodies, in any case, newer revenue handles will have to be innovatively unearthed; this is 
especially important because the GST regime might take away some of the existing ones (see 
Rao and Rao, 2008). Many times the argument is advanced that the requirements are so huge 
that clearly such efforts will not help solve the problem. This is true, however what is not 
recognized is that such efforts help create a far healthier balance sheet for the local bodies. 
In their turn the local bodies can present a decent rating and a viable borrowing-risk that is 
acceptable to the Financial Institutions. The financial institutions can hence be approached 
for underwriting or taking exposure, and this is the second prong of our suggestion”. 
The idea can be extended to creation of virtual entities formed by considering 
different local bodies. The entire set of local bodies will have to be classified into different 
classes according to economic criteria and strengths and then schemes can be worked out for 
‘cross-overs’ that will allow even the weaker local bodies to access credit. Such a scheme 
has been proposed by Pethe and Lalvani (2006) in the case of Urban Local Bodies. Indeed, 
we would suggest the coming together of some PRIs with their urban counter parts too. 
There is something to be said for a ‘regional’ approach in these matters (see Pethe and 
Lalvani, 2007), for example consider the case of Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR) 
which is being looked at for Mumbai Transformation Project. It has been noted that the 
thoughtless legitimization of the artificial dichotomy between urban and rural bodies has 
done more harm than good (see Jha and Mathur, 1999). This implies that we should be 
looking at the entire space as one integrated continuum dotted with local bodies.   
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In this context, we suggest the setting up of an incentive fund by the ThFC, which can 
be used for data compilation and accounting reforms but most importantly as seed money for 
projects which will access financial markets. The minimum amount per project could be 5 
per cent of the project cost thus creating a leveraging effect which is almost 20 times over. 
The total amount of the incentive fund could be about 6 per cent of total devolution to local 
bodies and should be devolved across States on the basis of properly weighted variables such 
as population, area, number of local bodies (rural/ urban with types i.e., Corporations, A, B, 
C types appropriately weighted) etc. Thus, anticipating what comes later in the study, the 
total amount of the incentive fund will be about 5.5 to 6 thousand crore
2. This fund should be 
used for project feasibility or consultancy as well as underwriting and such other costs but 
overwhelming proportion should be used as seed capital for the project. The most important 
condition that we would recommend is that this must be a project that is undertaken by 
more than one local body and must have at least one ‘weak’ local body, including a PRI. 
Thus, our suggestion should incentivize inclusive regional approach and break down of the 
artificial ‘urban rural’ dichotomy
3. The stronger local bodies will have an incentive to work 
at spatial fringes (where typically the service delivery is below average) and come together 
with weaker local bodies (urban or rural) thereby unwittingly serving the tenet of inclusive 
development mandate. The incentive fund(not to be confused as incentive for 
doing things write – although that may well be the case with the local bodies 
who can benefit from this – is to be explicitly used as a leveraging fund (since 
FC cannot involve in ‘capital’ expenditure). It is amply clear from the 
econometric evidence reported in this paper, that those states that have 
decentralized more have shown significantly greater revenue buoyancies for 
their local bodies. This is a clear incentive for the states to decentralize 
(whether through increasing revenue handles or assignments). As far as the 
access to financial markets by group is concerned, the incentives for all the 
parties are reasonably clear. All that remains is for some side(s) to take the 
first step. I do not think that one should stop at saying that this is not done! If 
there is something in the rules we could change them to enable. 
                                                 
2 The total money kept aside for local bodies will be to the tune of 1 lakh crore implying a fourfold increase in 
devolution. 
3 The Government of India launched a Pooled Finance Development Scheme in November 2006 to assist ULBs 
to access market borrowings. Similar scheme may be extended to all local bodies including PRIs as well.   
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The second way to strengthen decentralization is to effectively transfer funds to the 
local bodies that represent a quantum jump from the past and hence increase the local 
government size. There have always been doubts regarding the absorptive capacity as well as 
the governance at the local level while transferring large scale resources to the local level. 
However, there is good argument in favour of just devolving funds with faith, that the 
capacity will be created. Thus, while recognizing the need and the efforts that are required to 
be taken for capacity building, it is not necessary to treat it as an essential prerequisite for 
transferring resources to the local level. This would require well funded institution building 
and it will be worth looking into the financing of it.  
In the context of resource transfers from the CFC to the local bodies, the CFC should 
ensure that the amount of transfers to the local bodies is not decided on an ad hoc basis rather 
it is estimated based on the needs and capacities of the local governments in a normative 
sense. It is important that the CFC should make the local body grants unconditional, i.e., it 
should not demand matching contributions from the State Governments or local bodies. It is 
observed that the Central Government releases a substantial part of the share in Central taxes 
in the last month of the fiscal year, i.e., March. This makes it difficult for the State 
Governments to plan their expenditure. In the case of grants to local bodies, the CFC should 
ensure that the release of the grant is evenly distributed over the fiscal year. Further, after 
releasing resources to the State Governments, the CFC has to ensure that the State 
Governments are transferring these grants promptly and efficiently to the third tier of the 
Government. This is a matter of efficient processes and institutional practices and requires 
clear and well formulated recommendations by the SFCs, that are formed with good sense 
and responsibility and whose awards are – as a rule – accepted and implemented. In this 
context, the creation of a uniform template for SFCs assumes significance. 
  Though the setting up of the SFCs is constitutionally mandated, most of the State 
Governments are setting up SFCs in a casual manner not necessarily keeping in mind the skill 
sets required to do a competent job. Similarly, the State Governments are not taking the SFC 
awards seriously and sometimes treat them with hostility. Thus, to repeat, the non-synchronic 
setting up of SFCs (even when they are set up) and non-uniform treatment by different State 
Governments has meant that they are not useful as providers of inputs to the Central Finance 
Commissions. It is in this context, the present study opines that the CFC may attempt to 
suggest a uniform template for the SFCs.   
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  The CFC may include the following aspects in SFC template (Table 10).  
Table 10: The Outline of a Model SFC Template 
Item   Template  
Time of setting up of SFC  At least two years before the setting up of 
the Fourteenth FC – 2011 
Number of SFC members  Same as in CFC 
Qualifications of the members   As applicable to CFC 
Award period of the SFC  2015-16 to 2019-20 
Duration of SFC  One and a half years, extendable up to 2 
years 
Transfers   Share in State’s Taxes and Grants-in-aid 
Requirement of local bodies  Based on normative assessment 
Distribution of transfers  Based on devolution formula 
Components of devolution formula  1.  Economic backwardness 
2.  Social backwardness 
3.  Rural urban divide 
4.  Needs on a normative basis 
5.  Efforts of the local bodies 
6.  Quality of service delivery 
Method of distribution of funds  First to the district and then to the local 
bodies within the district 
Central Finance Commission  Detailed  discussion  on  how  much  the 
CFC should augment the consolidated 
fund of the State for transferring the 
required amount to the local 
government level 
 
The specification of the year of setting up the SFC and its uniform award period are 
very important in the context of CFC. The report of the SFCs should contain a chapter on 
what percentage of the requirement of the local bodies CFC should bear and augment the 
consolidated fund of the State Governments accordingly. While projecting the requirements 
of the local bodies on a normative basis, the major hurdle faced by the SFCs is the lack of 
adequate and reliable data on various parameters at the local body level. Thus, the State 
Governments may set up data warehouses on local finances by using the resources and 
expertise of Universities/Research Institutes/State Governments. Since O&M expenditure is 
the primary concern of the SFCs, it would be ideal if the data warehouse attempts to prepare 
an asset map, public and private separately, for each local body.  
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The lack of authentic data base also poses challenges for distributing the vertically 
decided amount among the local Governments
4. In this context, it may be noted that most of 
the detailed information, such as distance from highest income, index of backwardness, etc. is 
available at the district level, which is the largest geographical entity inside a State. As far as 
the local bodies are concerned, with some effort, financial data and information on their 
population and area should be available. Given the difficulty involved in reconciling the 
characteristics at the district level and those at the local government level we suggest a two-
stage strategy for the devolution of funds: 
¾  Stage 1: Use some specially selected criteria in combination with estimated shares for 
each district to arrive at the disbursement to each district. 
¾  Stage 2: Having obtained the disbursement for each district, develop a method for 
distribution of funds to each local body. 
Regarding the devolution formula for distributing the transfers to the local bodies
5, 
the CFC may outline some major components such as economic backwardness, social 
backwardness, effort of the local bodies, needs of the local bodies, etc. while leaving the 
freedom to select the specific indicators in each category with the respective SFCs. To 
illustrate, economic backwardness can be quantified in a number of ways such as distance 
from the highest per capita income, per cent of agricultural income to the total income, per 
cent of population below poverty line, etc. The SFCs can select appropriate indicator in each 
category depending upon the regional specificities and data availability. Similarly, the CFC 
should leave the freedom to attach weight to each criterion with the SFCs, which the SFC 
would be in a better position to do owing to its closeness to the State-specific issues.  
                                                 
4 There are several methods in existence for formulating an approach towards devolution of funds to Local 
Bodies. Some of these have, at least, a partially theoretical basis, while some others are purely ad-hoc (informed 
by political and such other exigencies). Pethe, Karnik and Karmarkar, 2006 developed a methodology, which 
comprises of five cardinal principles or ‘Panchtatva’, abbreviated as PEACE. PEACE stands for (a) Political 
Feasibility (b) Equity (c) Adequacy (d) Computational Transparency and (e) Efficiency. In a study for the 
UNDP/UNCHS (2002) the authors have worked out the devolution of funds for all the ULBs in Maharashtra. 
5  The formulae must be credible and compatible to incentives. The weights in the formulae used for devolution 
must be seen to be fair. Pethe and Lalvani (2005) suggested a scheme called ‘FAIR PLAN’ approach. The 
conceptual framework of this approach comprises eight cardinal principles. Each of the alphabets in the 
acronym ‘FAIR PLAN’ stands for:  Fairness, Adequacy, Incentive Compatibility, Responsiveness, Political 




Further, with regard to the normative assessment, the CFC may provide some broad 
guidelines in the template. To illustrate, the CFC may suggest a general approach on how to 
assess the needs on a normative basis in the following lines: Proportion of norms achieved by 
the local body with regard to the assets identified. For each of the spheres there are 
underlying norms in terms of area/population etc. The extent of achievement gap clearly 
indicates how much more needs to be done. Based on this, the SFCs will be able to estimate 
the required expenditure for the development of the region in various sectors. The SFCs may 
calculate the expenditure gap by comparing the estimated required expenditure with the 
actual expenditure. Further, by calculating the ratio of actual expenditure to the required 
expenditure, the SFCs may calculate the effort of the local bodies in each of the spheres.  
It is reported that lack of competent people to accomplish the SFC job efficiently is a 
problem faced by the State Governments. In view of this, the Central Government may set 
up a pool of fiscal experts with adequate regional representation. The State 
Governments, while setting up the SFC may select at least one member of the SFC from 
this central pool. Further, the Central Government may consider extending some technical 
guidance to the SFC members of all States. The Central Government may request the help of 
previous CFC members for this.  
We feel that just providing the uniform template may not help much in the matter. 
Thus, it would be better if the CFC can put forward a time line of events linked to the release 
of FC transfers from the Central Government. A model timeline is provided in Table 11.  
Table 11: Time line for the Release of Share in Central Taxes 
Release of Share in Central Taxes  Time line 
For the year 2010-11  After setting up the SFC 
For the year 2012-13  After getting the report of SFC 
For the year 2013-14  After getting the accepted 
recommendations 
For the year 2014-15  After getting the action taken report  
  
The FC grants should not be linked to the progress made in the area of SFCs, because 
these grants are mostly directed towards specific sectors and States who are backward in 
respect of those sectors. We feel that the development of these sectors or States should not be 
adversely affected by the condition of SFC. On the other hand, share in Central taxes is a 
right of the State Governments. Under normal circumstances fiscal federalism does not prefer 
conditions for the release of these amounts to the State Governments. However, it should also  
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be remembered that under fiscal federalism the local governments should also enjoy the same 
right to receive funds from the higher levels of Government. If the State Governments are 
denying this right of the local Governments by not transferring enough resources to them, the 
Central Government can step in with some conditions on the release of transfers to the State 
Governments in the interest of fiscal federalism at the third tier. If the State Governments are 
following the time line indicated in Table 10, in 2013 the Fourteenth Finance Commission 
will be in a position to use the SFC reports as inputs for their recommendations. This can give 
a great fillip to the fiscal decentralization at the third tier of the Government in India.  
Till such time as the decentralization truly takes root and SFCs are established and 
recognized, the CFC may think of talking directly to the local bodies (at the district level) 
and may try to directly transfer funds to them. 
IV.2  Grants to the Local Bodies – the Estimation and the Devolution Formula 
Why Operation and Maintenance 
Operations and maintenance (O&M) expenditure are recognized as crucial recurrent 
outlays necessary to optimally sustain a project or program. In addition to macro-economic 
consequences there are beneficial social welfare effects attached to them. These are in terms 
of better delivery of services and indirectly through labour intensive maintenance leading to 
greater employment. However, the political preference is not for O&M which is the first 
casualty in face of scarcity of resources. This is myopic and reflects an inadequate 
understanding of costly down stream effects of neglecting the efficient maintenance. Failure 
to provide adequate O&M has consequences for the returns on public investments and the 
ramifications are confined not only locally but also at the level of macro-economy, in terms 
of growth and employment. Thus, it is essential that routine, periodic and renewal or 
rehabilitation components of maintenance are treated in an integral fashion so as to maximize 
benefits. As an aside, and by way of an illustrative example, we may mention that even in a 
leading and progressive state like Maharashtra, there are 50,000 assets related to ‘water 
project’ in a state of disrepair and disuse. It is claimed that this is so for want of funds. There 
is a talk about ‘handing over the ownership’ of local assets created through various schemes 
to the local bodies to ensure better O&M as well as accountable delivery (Mujumdar, 2007). 
It is in this context that we are proposing that the single external locus of O&M be 
vested importantly with the Central Finance Commission. This is not to exempt the 
responsibility of the other authorities (State Government for example) of properly budgeting  
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O&M costs in its project and program formulation but given the strain on their resources for 
some time at least it is unrealistic to expect them to shoulder the entire responsibility. Our 
position is further refined – in the current context – to cover not only the projects that are 
small and strictly local public goods, but also within that to those related to water, education 
and roads in a well defined and delimited fashion.  
When one is talking about the O&M expenditure, it is important to recognize that 
inequality of stocks should not be a consideration. For rectification of such inequalities there 
are other avenues. Thus, O&M expenditures are not equalizing in this sense (as they ought 
not to be). Indeed misallocation of resources (i.e. funds flowing without commensurate stocks 
that are to be maintained) will lead to either diversion of resources or inefficient utilization of 
the same. It would be a simple matter to gauge the relative valuation of the relevant assets 
and use it for determining the fund flow using this criterion with the condition that these be 
used for precisely the purpose of O&M of water, education and road assets.  
Why Water, Education and Roads  
  As far as water is concerned it is the life line of civilizations, it is said that the next 
world war will be fought about water. It is important to combine all the assets created via 
schemes that look at the consumption (drinking/conservation/wells) as well as the investment 
(minor irrigation schemes/harvesting) aspects and play them through the instrumentality of 
local bodies. The water programmes are not functioning properly especially the ones with 
respect to minor irrigation. Indeed the technical committee on water shed development has 
opined that given the estimate of about Rs.1,50,000 crore and the actual devolution is 
woefully short, there is a good case for combining all related centrally sponsored schemes. It 
has been noted that such programs alone will be the saviors of agriculture in rain fed regions. 
Of course, in case of drought prone areas there would have to be a different approach.  There 
is evidence to show that the political empowerment of women have also thrown up such 
schemes as perceived priorities so that acceptability will not be an issue (for all assertions 
made above see, India Infrastructure Reports especially 2007 dealing with Rural 
Infrastructure, also see Annual Report of RDD, GoI 2007, Shubham Chaudhary, 2007 and 
N.A. Mujumdar, 2007).  
Education as a constituent of development – rather than an instrument – needs no 
argument, especially post Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom (Sen, 1999). But its 
delivery through various schemes (notably Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan) as now designed is  
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unsatisfactory. Whilst we have – because of constraints of data – considered only Primary 
and Secondary level education, the vocational component needs to be considered too. The 
externality of such reorganization will be that the utilization/service delivery – via 
accountability – will improve and through impetus to the rural hubs initiative, livelihoods will 
be created, which alone is the surest way of empowerment.  
The road connectivity leads to remarkable impact on the lives of the rural folk, as has 
been amply documented. As Narayan et al have pointed out (See, India Infrastructure Report 
2007), the prevailing conditions make it difficult for people to get their goods to the market 
or for people to get to their place of work or indeed to access health in emergency and 
generally to access public services.  
Here one ought to emphasize that there are two elements viz., health and power that 
we have left out that are generally recognized as important. The reason is that whilst some 
elements (extension) can be incorporated, prioritization requires that things be kept at 
manageable levels and also that there are indications (from experience elsewhere) that given 
the skill demands of both these sectors and the prevailing situation these are not sectors that 
lend themselves to easy and successful decentralization. Before we get on with the job of 
estimation of O&M and hence devolution to local bodies, we may enter a caveat. The data 
and the norms are not completely satisfactory. It is clear that once the SFCs perform their 
task properly will this problem be settled meaningfully. The question is that in the absence 
of such an event and in the interim what is to be done. Making use of some of the well 
known studies/sources we have given thumb-rule norms (that could well be refined). 
Estimation of Grants to Local Bodies 
In the present study, we have confined our analysis to the computation of local body 
grants and State-wise shares in the total local body grants, without segregating urban and 
rural local bodies, owing to the data and time constraints. As already mentioned, we have 
concentrated on the operation and maintenance expenditure on water, education and roads. 
We have considered wells and minor irrigation projects in the area of water, primary and 
secondary schools in education and municipal and surfaced and un-surfaced village/ZP roads  
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in the case of roads
6. The O&M expenditure norms in rupees terms used in the present study 
for the different types of assets are given in Table 12. 
 
Table 12: O&M Expenditure norms for Assets 
Asset O&M  Expenditure 
Norm 
Source  
Wells    Rs.2,000/year/well  10 % of the amount needed for the 
minor irrigation 
Minor irrigation  Rs.20,000/year/minor 
irrigation 
5 % of the total cost of minor irrigation* 
Primary schools  Rs.5,000/teacher/month  Education Budget Allocation and 
National Education Goals: 
Implications for Teacher Salary Level 
by Pankaj. S. Jain, 2006 
Secondary schools  Rs.6,000/teacher/month  10 % more than the primary school 
Surfaced road  Rs.20,000/km/year  India Infrastructure Report, 2007 
Un-surfaced road  Rs.2,000/km/year  10 % of the expenses for surfaced road 
*The maximum limit for setting up a minor irrigation project is Rs.400000.  
We have used the following simple equation to arrive at the O&M requirements of the 
local bodies.  
O&M requirement = n*P + n*S + n*W + n*M + n*SR + n*USR 
Where,  
n = respective norms as given in text table 11. 
P = number of primary schools 
S = number of secondary schools 
W = number of wells 
M = number of minor irrigation projects 
SR = length of surfaced road 
USR = length of un-surfaced road 
Based on these information, we have estimated the O&M expenditure requirement of 
the local bodies at Rs.1,88,902 crore for the period 2010-11 to 2014-2015
7. It may be recalled 
                                                 
6 We have collated the state-wise data on these assets from the website indiastat.com. The limitations of the data 
are detailed in Appendix IV. The raw data on all the assets used in the present study are also provided in 
Appendix IV.   
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that the TFC had recommended Rs.25,000 crore (0.7 per cent of GDP for the year 2005-06) 
as grants to local bodies. If the ThFC wants to retain the ratio of local body grants to GDP at 
0.7 per cent, it would have to increase the local body grants to Rs.47,880 crore. However, 
given the pathetic fiscal position of local bodies, the urgent need for maintaining the public 
assets and the problems associated with the SFCs and their recommendations, an increase in 
the ratio of local body grants to GDP from 0.7 per cent to at least 1.4 per cent seems 
legitimate. Further, as already mentioned, the size of local government in India (1.75 per cent 
of GDP) is far below the international standards. Thus, apart from enabling the local bodies 
to raise more revenues on their own, there is an urgent need to increase the revenue transfers 
from the higher levels of Government to the local bodies in India. In this context, it is 
important to ensure a gradual increase in the local body grants to GDP ratio by the successive 
Finance Commissions.  
Further, the share of grants in the total FC transfers stands at 13 per cent in India. The 
TFC has already opined that there is a need to increase the amount of grants in the total FC 
transfers with a view to bringing in more predictability to the FC transfers. As per the 
recommendations of the Twelfth FC, grants for local bodies is the most important grant after 
the post devolution non-plan revenue deficit grant, constituting 17.5 per cent of the total FC 
grants. However, with the revenue account of the State Governments turning into a surplus in 
the recent years, the post devolution non-plan revenue deficit grant will become insignificant 
during the award period of the Thirteenth FC. Thus, the Thirteenth FC may afford to raise the 
ratio of local body grants to the total FC grants as well as ratio of FC grants to the total FC 
transfers during its award period. This will be a welcome development from the point of view 
of the predictability of the FC transfers. 
It may be mentioned that a FC grant of 1.4 per cent of GDP would be able to finance 
at least 50 per cent of the O&M requirements of the local bodies. Out of the remaining 
requirement, a part may be financed by the respective State Governments and a part may be 
financed by the local bodies themselves. Accordingly, the respective State Governments may 
finance 30 per cent of the total requirement and 20 per cent may be financed by the local 
bodies themselves. Thus, the respective shares of each tier of the government in the total 
O&M requirement are given in Table 13. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        








             Table 13: Shares of different tiers of Government in the total O&M 
                                   Requirement of the local bodies 
                                                                                                             (Amount in Rs.crore) 
Tier of Government  Share of O&M requirement  As per cent of GDP 2010-11 
Central Government  94,451 1.4
State Governments  56,671 0.8
Local Governments  37,780 0.6
Total Requirement  1,88,902 2.8
Note: GDP for year 2010-11 has been projected using three year moving average growth rate.   
 
Distribution of Local Body Grants among the State Governments 
In this section we present a formula for distributing the local body grants among the 
State Governments. It may be recalled that the Eleventh Finance Commission (EFC) and the 
TFC had distributed the grants based on formulae. The various components of the formula 
included population, area, revenue effort and distance from the highest per capita income. 
The EFC had used index of decentralization and the TFC had used the index of deprivation 
apart from the above-mentioned criteria. In the present study, we present two different 
devolution methodologies: (i) one simple formula based on population, area and share in 
O&M requirements and (ii) a refined formula by incorporating fiscal capacity and taking 
population and area in relation to the assets along with the respective shares in O&M 
requirements.  
We admit the relevance of population and area for distributing the local body grants. 
Thus, in our simple devolution formula, we have used these two criteria to calculate the 
shares of States. However, we have decided to use them in relation to the assets in the refined 
version of the formula.  
We are not fully convinced with the logic of using revenue effort of the State 
Government as a criterion for distributing the local body grants. We are of the view that the  
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local bodies should not be penalized for the fiscal laggardness of the State to which they 
belong. We can take revenue effort of the State Governments as a criterion if the end use of 
the grant rests with the State Government. In the case of local body grants the State 
Government is only a mediator between the Central Government and the local bodies. The 
revenue effort of the local body too is circumscribed by the over bearing State Acts that are 
biting and non-uniform across States. We do not therefore believe that the time is yet ripe for 
this to be a part of the devolution formula at the local body level. 
As a proxy for the fiscal capacity of the State Governments, distance from the highest 
per capita income is a good indicator for distributing the local body grants. However, in the 
present Study we have calculated the fiscal capacity of the State Governments in relation to 
the O&M requirements of the local bodies. We feel that this is more appropriate because the 
whole purpose is to distribute grants for the O&M requirements of the local bodies.  
It is true that decentralization in its all forms, fiscal, political and administrative, have 
to be encouraged in the country. The comprehensive one available through the NCAER 
report is – we fear – not very practical given the data constraints. Perhaps the present FC 
could evolve a simple and transparent (and verifiable) formula that follows the 3Fs and uses 
it. However, we do not agree with the idea of using index of decentralization in the 
devolution formula for achieving this end. Decentralization in a particular State depends on 
the political ideology of the ruling party of the State. The local bodies should not be punished 
for the anti-decentralization stand of the State Governments. Instead, some measure of 
decentralization can be a good criterion for the statutory tax devolution to the States so that 
the pro-decentralization States may receive an add-on while others lose out.  
We are of the view that the index of deprivation which is calculated on the basis of 
lack of safe drinking water, lack of latrines within the house and lack of access to good 
sanitation facilities is not a good indicator for distributing the local body grants. It may be 
mentioned that creation of assets for reducing deprivation is not under the purview of FC. 
Instead Planning Commission through the plan grants can take care of this aspect. Under the 
present federal set up in India, FC is concerned only about the O&M expenditure of the assets 
which are already created through the plans.  
Thus, we feel that for distributing the local body grants which is primarily meant for 
meeting the O&M expenditure of the local bodies on water, education and roads, the FC 
should give utmost priority to the share of each State in the total O&M requirements. Thus, in  
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the simple devolution formula we have given 60 per cent weight to this criterion, the other 
two criteria being population and area with a weight of 20 per cent each. The share of each 




Table 14: State-wise Shares in Local Body Grants (Formula 1) 
State 
Share in Local 
body Grant 
Andhra Pradesh  7.3







Himachal Pradesh  1.1














Tamil Nadu  4.6
Tripura 0.6
Uttar Pradesh  13.3
Uttarakhand 0.9
West Bengal  4.1




The merit of formula 1 is its computational simplicity. However, the lack of 
consideration of fiscal capacity of the States while distributing the grants to the States is the 
major drawback of this formula. Thus, in the next section we present a refined formula by 
incorporating fiscal capacity. 
 
  
A Refined Variant of the Devolution Formula 
In the refined devolution formula, we have given a weight of 50 per cent to the share 
of O&M requirement of each state in the total requirement.  
The fiscal capacity of the State Governments is the second factor which should 
receive priority after the O&M requirement while distributing the local body grants among 
the State Governments. This is because of the fact that different State Governments are 
differently placed in their capacity to finance expenditure. As already mentioned, the 
respective State Governments have to bear 30 per cent of the respective O&M requirement of 
the local bodies. We have calculated the 30 per cent of the O&M requirement of each State as 





















                Table 15: State’s shares in the total O & M Requirements 
                                                                         (Amount in Rs. crore) 
State  State’s Share in O&M Per cent 
 Requirements to  GSDP 
Andhra Pradesh  3915 0.9 
Arunachal Pradesh  168 3.1 
Assam 1995 2.9 
Bihar 1929 1.9 
Chhattisgarh 1620 2.2 
Goa 68 0.2 
Gujarat 1948 0.5 
Haryana 851 0.4 
Himachal Pradesh  584 1.0 
Jammu and Kashmir  985 2.6 
Jharkhand 345 0.4 
Karnataka 3397 1.0 
Kerala 1994 0.9 
Madhya Pradesh  6866 3.5 
Maharashtra 6131 0.7 
Manipur 262 3.3 
Meghalaya 295 3.3 
Mizoram 145 2.5 
Nagaland 224 1.8 
Orissa 3325 3.1 
Punjab 1020 0.6 
Rajasthan 5277 2.5 
Sikkim 88 2.9 
Tamil Nadu  2452 0.6 
Tripura 423 2.7 
Uttar Pradesh  8083 1.6 
Uttarakhand 419 0.1 
West Bengal  1864 0.4 
Total 56671 0.8 
     Note: GSDP for the year 2010-11 estimated based on three year moving average   
               growth rate has been used in this table.  
It is evident from table 14 that some of the States, especially the north eastern States 
and poor States such as MP, Orissa, etc. have to transfer a larger share of their GSDP to the 
local bodies to finance 30 per cent of O&M requirements. We feel that while distributing the  
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local body grants the FC may consider this factor. In the present Study, we attach 25 per cent 
weight to this criterion, viz., ‘fiscal capacity of the States’.  
We have included a new criteria ‘population pressure on the assets’ with a weight of 
12.5 per cent in the devolution formula instead of using population shares directly. We feel 
that this is a meaningful criterion as far as the O&M expenditure are concerned since wear 
and tear of the assets will be more if there is more population pressure on the assets.  
We have used the following equation to arrive at the population pressure on assets
8.  
PPA = {w*(P/S) + w*(P/W) + w*(P/R)}/10000 
Where,  
PPA = Population Pressure on Assets 
w = equal weight given to all the assets.  We have fixed the value of w at 0.3333. 
P = Population 
S = schools (both primary and secondary) 
W = assets in the area of water (wells and minor irrigation projects) 
R = roads (both surfaced and un-surfaced) 
In this context, it may be mentioned that population pressure on the public assets will 
be less in a particular sector if the role of the private sector is more in that sector. This may be 
a relevant argument in the case of developed regions as well as sectors like education and 
health. However, we have decided to include this criterion in our devolution formula because 
in the case of poorer rural areas and sectors like roads and water, we feel that the role of 
private sector is insignificant.  
The next criterion we have included in the devolution formula is the ‘inverse of asset 
density’ with a weight of 12.5 per cent. It is well documented in the literature that there exists 
cost differentials in providing public services first due to low density of population and 
secondly due to mountainous terrain. We feel the same applies to O&M cost too. Thus, if 
asset density is less, then maintaining those assets situated in isolated far off places will also 
be high. Conversely, if inverse of asset density is more the state should receive more grants 
for the operation and maintenance of assets. This is relevant in the hilly areas of the country, 
the north eastern states, etc.  
We have used the following equation to calculate the inverse of asset density
9.  
                                                 
8 Detailed tables are given in Appendix VI.  
9 Detailed tables are given in Appendix VII.   
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IAD = {w*(A/S) + w*(A/W) + w*(A/R)}/10000 
Where,  
IAD = Inverse of Asset Density 
w = equal weight given to all the assets.  We have fixed the value of w at 0.3333. 
A = Area of the State 
S = schools (both primary and secondary) 
W = assets in the area of water (wells and minor irrigation projects) 
R = roads (both surfaced and un-surfaced) 
Based on the above discussion, the devolution formula for distributing the local body 
grants is presented in Table 16. 
                Table 16: Devolution formula for distributing 
                                        Local Body Grants 
Criterion Weight
Share in total O & M requirements  50 %
Fiscal Capacity of States  25 %
Population Pressure on Assets  12.5 %
Inverse of Asset Density  12.5 %
 
Based on the formula presented in Table 16, we have worked out each state’s share in 












                                                 





Table 17: State-wise Shares in Local Body Grants (Formula II) 
State 
Share in Local 
body Grant 
Andhra Pradesh  5.7







Himachal Pradesh  1.2














Tamil Nadu  4.3
Tripura 1.7
Uttar Pradesh  11.7
Uttarakhand 0.6
West Bengal  2.8




The shares calculated using the refined formula provided higher shares to the poorer 
States, particularly Special Category States
11. Table 18 provides a comparative picture of 
devolution based on both the formulae.  
Table 18: Comparison of Formula I and II 
State  Formula I Formula II
Improvement (+)/ 
Deterioration (-) 
Andhra Pradesh  7.3 5.7 -1.6 
Arunachal Pradesh  0.7 1.5 0.7 
Assam 3.1 3.9 0.8 
Bihar 4.3 3.4 -0.8 
Chhattisgarh 2.9 3.5 0.5 
Goa 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Gujarat 4.3 3.4 -0.8 
Haryana 1.6 1.3 -0.2 
Himachal Pradesh  1.1 1.2 0.1 
Jammu and Kashmir  2.6 2.4 -0.2 
Jharkhand 1.4 0.6 -0.7 
Karnataka 5.8 5.5 -0.3 
Kerala 3.0 3.1 0.2 
Madhya Pradesh  10.4 10.9 0.5 
Maharashtra 10.3 9.6 -0.7 
Manipur 0.5 1.7 1.2 
Meghalaya 0.5 1.7 1.2 
Mizoram 0.3 1.3 1.0 
Nagaland 0.4 1.0 0.7 
Orissa 5.2 5.8 0.6 
Punjab 1.9 1.6 -0.2 
Rajasthan 8.8 8.2 -0.6 
Sikkim 0.1 1.3 1.1 
Tamil Nadu  4.6 4.3 -0.3 
Tripura 0.6 1.7 1.1 
Uttar Pradesh  13.3 11.7 -1.6 
Uttarakhand 0.9 0.6 -0.3 
West Bengal  4.1 2.8 -1.3 
 
                                                 
11 However, there are exceptions to this general trend. Among the special category States Jammu and 
Kashmir and Uttarakhand and among the poorer States Bihar, Jharkhand, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh 
experienced deterioration in their shares with the refined formula. Relatively low values for the population 




However, it may be mentioned that our analysis is tentative due to the inherent 
limitations of the data we have used. The basic objective of this study is to illustrate a norm-
based methodology for estimating the local body grants as well as designing devolution 
formula for distributing the same among the State Governments. The Thirteenth Finance 
Commission with richer data and other resources may take a view based on further analysis.  
V.  Recommendations and Conclusion 
To sum up, the fiscal position of local bodies both urban and rural does not seem to be 
promising in India. These local level institutions have to be strengthened by giving more 
revenue handles on the one hand and by transferring more resources on the other. The State 
Governments have an active role to play in strengthening the local bodies. The finances of the 
State Governments display a healthier picture in the post FRL period. However, the fiscal 
correction process needs to be fine tuned by providing a micro design to the targets. This may 
enable the State Governments to devolve more funds to the lower level without jeopardizing 
the normal expenditure both revenue and capital of the State Governments.  
The functioning of SFCs in different States documents a dismal picture in India even 
after the 73
rd and 74
th constitutional amendments. In view of this, the CFC may bring in 
tightened policy suggestions to enforce fiscal federalism at the third tier. The CFC may 
suggest a uniform template for the SFCs and may treat the progress made in the arena of SFC 
as a condition for the release of share in central taxes.  
The FC grants to the local bodies may be determined on the basis of a normative 
approach. The CFC may concentrate on the O&M expenditure requirement of the local 
bodies since that is the major fiscal lacuna at the local level. Based on a normative 
assessment with the available data the present study proposes a quantum jump in the grants to 
local bodies from Rs.25,000 crore to Rs.94,451 crore (1.4 per cent of GDP for the year 2010-
11) for the five year period 2010-11 to 2014-15. This would amounts to roughly 0.3 per cent 
of GDP every year. This could be split up into 20:80 shares for the urban and rural local 
bodies respectively. In addition, the study also urges the CFC to set up an incentive fund flow 
of around Rs. 6,000 crore for helping the local bodies to access the capital market.  
In nutshell, the following are the important suggestions put forward in the present 
study.  
•  Include a measure of decentralization in the devolution formula for the share 
in central taxes.  
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•  Keep the grants to local bodies unconditional. 
•  Ensure that the release of local body grants is evenly distributed over the fiscal 
year.  
•  Ensure that the State Governments are transferring the local body grants 
promptly and efficiently to the local Government level. 
•  Provide a uniform template to the SFCs. 
•  Incentivize the State Governments to set up a data warehouse for the local 
bodies. 
•  Set up a central pool of fiscal experts from which the State Governments may 
select at least one member of SFC. 
•  Provide a time line to the State Governments in link to the release of share in 
central taxes for making progress in the arena of SFC. 
•  Estimate the grants to local bodies on a normative basis. 
•  Provide Rs.94,451 crore as the local body grant. 
•  Set up an incentive fund of Rs.6,000 crore for assisting the local bodies to 
access capital market. 
•  Devolve the local body grant on a formula basis among the State 
Governments.  
•  Till such time as the decentralization truly takes root and SFCs are well 
established and recognized, talk directly to the local bodies (at the district 
level), and think of transferring resources directly to them. 
The study is an exercise to estimate local body grants based on a normative approach. 
Based on operations and maintenance expenditure required for three major assets i.e. water, 
education and roads, the amount of grants is estimated at Rs.94,451 crore for the local bodies 
(both urban and rural). The study has also devised formulae (one simple and the other 
refined) for distribution of the grants across the States.  The Thirteenth Finance Commission 
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Appendix I(a):  First SFC Reports: Dates of Constitution, Report Submission & Action 
Taken 
 

















21.5.2003 6.6.2003  3.7.2003  2003-04  to 
 2005-06 




Not submitted  Not 
submitted 
- 
Chattisgarh 22.8.2003  Not  submitted  -  - 







Submitted  1996-97 to  
2000-01 








24.4.2001 May,2003  Not 
submitted 
2004-2005 
 ( Interim) 
Jharkhand  28.01.2004  Not submitted    Not specified 
RLBs-5.8.1996,  Karnataka 10.6.1994 
ULBs 
30.1.1996 
31.3.1997  1997 -98 to  
2001-02 




17.8.1994  20.7.1996  20 7. 1996  1996-97 to  
2000-01 






28.7.1997  1996-97 to  
2000-01 
73rd Amendment not applicable as traditional Local  Meghalaya  SFC not yet 
constituted   Institution of Self Government exists in these States 
Mizoram  SFC not yet 
constituted  
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Nagaland  SFC not yet 
constituted  
    
Orissa 21.11.1996/ 
24.8.1998 * 
30.12.1998  9.7.1999  1998-99 to  
2004-05 $ 
Punjab  July, 1994  31.12.1995  13.9.1996  1996-97 to  
2000-01 




16.08.1999  June, 2000  2000-01 to  
2004-05 















Uttar Pradesh  22.10.1994  26.12.1996  20.1.1998  1996-97 to  
2000-01 
Uttaranchal  31.1.2001  2002  3.7.2004  2001-02 to  
2005-06 
West Bengal  30.5.1994  27.11.1995  22.7.1996  1996-97 to  
2000-01 
*: Date of reconstitution. In case of Gujarat, the SFC report on RLBs was submitted prior to the reconstitution of the SFC.  
#: As per the ATR, the SFC recommendations shall be effective from 1.4.1999. 
$: Though SFC was asked to submit the report covering a period of five years w.e.f. 1.4.1998, its report covers the period 
from 1998-99 to 2004-05. 
































of SFC report 
Date of 
submission 









Not constituted       











5. Chattisgarh  Not  constituted       
6. Goa  Not  constituted       
7. Gujarat  19.11.2003  Not  submitted   2005-06 
to  
2009-10 





25.5.1998 24.10.2002  24.06.2003  2002-03 
to  
2006-07 
10. Jammu  & 
Kashmir 
Not constituted       
II. Jharkhand  Not  constituted      
12.  Karnataka  October, 2000  December, 2002  Not submitted  2003-04 
to  
2007-08 





17.06.1999  July, 2003  Not submitted  2001-02 
to  
2005-06 
15. Maharashtra  22.06.1999  30.3.2002  Not  submitted 2001-02 




16. Manipur  03.01.2003  Submitted  Not  submitted 2001-02 
to  
2005-06 
17. Meghalaya         
18. Mizoram         
19. Nagaland         
20. Orissa  5.6.2003  25.10.2003  Not  submitted 2005-06 
to  
2009-10 
21. Punjab  Sep.,  2000  15.2.2002  08.06.2002  2001-02 
to  
2005-06 
22. Rajasthan  07.05.1999  30.08.200  I  26.03.2002  2000-01 
to  
2004-05 
23.  Sikkim  July, 2003  Not submitted    * 
24. Tamil  Nadu  2.12.1999  21.5.2001  8.5.2002  2002-03 
to  
2006-07 
25. Tripura  29.10.1999  10.4.2003  Not  submitted 2003-04 
to  
2007-08 
26.  Uttar Pradesh  February, 2000  June, 2002  30.04.2004  2001-02 
to  
2005-06 
27. Uttaranchal  Not  constituted       
28.  West Bengal  14.7.2000  6.2.2002  Not submitted  2001-02 
to  
2005-06 
  Constitution of Third SFCs 
3. Rajasthan  15-09-2005  February,  2008    2005-06 
to 2009-
10 
4. Tamil  Nadu  14-12-2004  September, 
2006 
May, 2007  2007-08 
to 2011-
12 
* No specific period of coverage has been prescribed. 
Source: (1) Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission, Government of India, 2004. 








Appendix II: Functions of Urban Local Bodies – Twelfth Schedule of Constitution of 
India 
 
1.  Urban Planning including town planning. 
2.  Regulation of land use and construction of buildings. 
3.  Planning for economic and social development. 
4.  Roads and bridges. 
5.  Water supply for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes. 
6.  Public health, sanitation conservancy and solid waste management. 
7. Fire  services. 
8.  Urban forestry, protection of the environment and promotion of ecological aspects. 
9.  Safe-guarding the interest of weaker sections of society, including the handicapped 
and mentally retarded. 
10.  Slums improvement and upgrading. 
11.  Urban poverty alleviation. 
12.   Provision  of  urban  amenities  and  facilities  such  as  parks,  gardens  and             
playgrounds. 
13.  Promotion of cultural, educational and aesthetic aspects. 
14.  Burials and burial grounds; cremations, cremation grounds and electric crematoriums 
15.  Cattle pounds; prevention of cruelty to animals. 
16.  Vital statistics, including registration of births and deaths. 
17.  Public amenities, including street lighting, parking lots, bus stops and public 
conveniences. 























Appendix III: Functions of Panchayat Raj Institutions – 
Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution of India  
 
No. Description  Category 
1 Agriculture  including  agricultural  extension   Agriculture and allied 
2  Land improvement, land reforms, land 
consolidation, soil conservation 
Agriculture and allied 
3  Minor irrigation, water management, watershed 
development 
Agriculture and allied 
4  Animal husbandry, dairy, poultry Agriculture  and  allied 
5 Fisheries  Agriculture  and  allied 
6  Social forestry, farm forestry Agriculture  and  allied 
7  Minor forest produce  Agriculture and allied 
8  Small scale industries      Industries 
9  Khadi, village, cottage industries      Industries 
10  Rural housing      Welfare 
11  Drinking water      Core 
12  Fuel and fodder  Agriculture and allied 
13  Roads, culverts, bridges, ferries, waterways      Core 
14  Rural electrification, electricity distribution       Core  
15  Non-conventional energy sources      Welfare 
16  Poverty alleviation programs       Welfare 
17  Education, including primary and secondary 
schools 
    Welfare 
18  Technical training and vocational education      Welfare 
19  Adult and non-formal education      Welfare 
20  Libraries      Welfare 
21  Cultural activities      Welfare 
22  Markets and fairs      Agriculture  and 
allied 
23  Health and sanitation, hospitals, primary health 
centres, dispensaries 
    Core 
24  Family welfare      Welfare 
25  Women and child development      Welfare 
26  Social welfare, welfare of handicapped and 
mentally retarded  
    Welfare 
27  Welfare of weaker sections, Scheduled Castes 
and Tribes  
    Welfare 
28  Public distribution system       Welfare 









Appendix IV – Limitations of the Data 
  We have collated the State-wise data on number of primary schools, secondary 
schools, municipal roads (surfaced and unsurfaced), major district roads, village roads, 
number of minor irrigation projects and wells from the website indiastat.com. Data on 
primary and secondary schools are as per the year 2004-05. We have taken the number of 
schools categorized as ‘middle senior basic schools’ in the website indiastat.com as the 
secondary schools in our study. Similarly, we have taken the number of schools categorized 
as ‘primary junior basic school’ as the primary schools in our study. Data for all the States 
including the three newly created States were available on the web site. 
  The data on major district roads as well as on village roads are as on February 2002. It 
is mentioned that data on major district roads and village roads for the three newly created 
States such as Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand are included under the respective 
parent States such as Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, respectively. We have used 
the population ratios of 73.3797 and 26.6203 for Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, 74.71 
and 25.29 for Bihar and Jharkhand, and 94.9676 and 5.0324 for Uttar Pradesh and 
Uttarakhand, respectively to arrive at the length of major district roads in each of the States. 
The data on village roads were included under the major district roads for some States such as 
Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Mizoram. Data on village roads were not available for a number 
of States such as Gujarat, Haryana, Maharashtra, Punjab, Sikkim and West Bengal. The data 
on municipal roads were not available for a number of States such as Arunachal Pradesh, 
Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim and Uttarakhand.  
  The data on wells were as on November 2000. The data on wells were not available 
for Jharkhand and Uttarakhand. Data on minor irrigation were not available for Chhattisgarh, 
Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Jharkhand, Uttarakhand and Tamil Nadu.  
All possible efforts have been made to trace the required data for the Study. Non-
availability of data in respect of a few States in certain sectors, however, would have 
implications for the findings of the Study. The raw data on all the above-mentioned assets are 







State-wise Data on Assets 













Pradesh 61680  16667 837 4641 141079 N.A.  9024.7
Arunachal 
Pradesh 1371  495 22 50 12169 4657  N.A.
Assam 30068  8143 214 419 26416 44135  1017
Bihar 39347  10963 354 4147 45541 N.A.  2011.1
Chhattisgarh 33595  10799 303 N.A. 225152 12556  N.A.
Goa 1003  73 58 18 4462 3974  426
Gujarat 16385  22623 579 N.A. 51555 N.A.  10723.6
Haryana 11800  2269 352 2274 19651 N.A.  2926.9
Himachal 
Pradesh 11178  2210 84 193 20772 560  903.5
Jammu and 
Kashmir 12049  4239 201 356 7671 3372  441
Jharkhand 16572 4933 N.A. N.A. 15416 N.A. N.A.
Karnataka 26645  26816 857 N.A. 108506 4665  6854.9
Kerala 6827  3049 210 424 18504 107988  10217.6
Madhya 
Pradesh 96737  34641 549 5129 620640 34610  9368.2
Maharashtra 41669  26295 693 N.A. 299608 N.A.  13304.1
Manipur 2552  831 25 31 6638 2172  73.4
Meghalaya 5851 1759 52 77 5416 604 26.4
Mizoram 1481  939 3 8 3518 N.A.  N.A.
Nagaland 1520  480 11 66 13754 5137  N.A.
Orissa 45700  15893 626 1401 38542 189445  9763.2
Punjab 13352  2503 117 6777 42757 N.A.  3974.4
Rajasthan 55942  26201 761 4133 72078 44287  3190.6
Sikkim 684  185 31 20 1502 N.A.  N.A.
Tamil Nadu  33470  7111 579 N.A. 51010 72470  10451.3
Tripura 1776  1001 48 41 5569 7912  160.7
Uttar 
Pradesh 129976  36874 526 12357 114841 30383  39554
Uttarakhand 14663  3861 N.A. N.A. 6086 1610  N.A.
West 









Appendix V – Estimation of O & M requirements of the Local Bodies for one year 
                                                                                                                    (Rs. crore) 
State Education Water Roads
O&M 
requirements 
Andhra Pradesh  2300 9.4 300 2610 
Arunachal 
Pradesh 78 0.1 34 112 
Assam 1186 0.9 143 1330 
Bihar 1183 8.4 95 1286 
Chhattisgarh 605 0.1 475 1080 
Goa 28 0.0 18 45 
Gujarat 1174 0.1 125 1299 
Haryana 517 4.6 45 567 
Himachal Pradesh  344 0.4 44 389 
Jammu and 
Kashmir 633 0.8 23 657 
Jharkhand 199 0.0 31 230 
Karnataka 2024 0.2 240 2264 
Kerala 1055 0.9 273 1329 
Madhya Pradesh  3238 10.4 1329 4577 
Maharashtra 3461 0.1 626 4087 
Manipur 157 0.1 18 175 
Meghalaya 184 0.2 12 196 
Mizoram 90 0.0 7 97 
Nagaland 111 0.1 38 149 
Orissa 1738 2.9 476 2216 
Punjab 573 13.6 93 680 
Rajasthan 3271 8.4 239 3518 
Sikkim 55 0.0 3 58 
Tamil Nadu  1366 0.1 268 1634 
Tripura 255 0.1 27 282 
Uttar Pradesh  4994 24.8 370 5389 
Uttaranchal 264 0.0 15 279 
West Bengal  1115 5.6 121 1242 









Appendix VI– Estimation of Population Pressure on Assets 
Population Pressure on Assets 
State Population Education Water Roads  Index 
Andhra Pradesh  75727541 927 1603 505  0.1011 
Arunachal 
Pradesh 1091117 555 2085 65  0.0902 
Assam 26638407 669 6054 372  0.2365 
Bihar 82878796 1579 1981 1743  0.1767 
Chhattisgarh 20795956 447 68634 87  2.3054 
Goa 1343998 1232 5659 152  0.2347 
Gujarat 50596992 1162 87387 812  2.9784 
Haryana 21082989 1452 913 934  0.1099 
Himachal Pradesh  6077248 439 3011 273  0.1241 
Jammu and 
Kashmir 10069917 588 2679 877  0.1381 
Jharkhand 26909428 1196 0 1746  0.0981 
Karnataka 52733958 896 61533 439  2.0954 
Kerala 31838619 3036 7155 233  0.3474 
Madhya Pradesh  60385118 437 1165 91  0.0564 
Maharashtra 96752247 1321 139614 309  4.7077 
Manipur 2388634 673 7214 269  0.2718 
Meghalaya 2306069 290 2822 381  0.1164 
Mizoram 891058 342 11237 253  0.3943 
Nagaland 1988636 949 2976 105  0.1343 
Orissa 36706920 567 2508 154  0.1076 
Punjab 24289296 1485 358 520  0.0787 
Rajasthan 56473122 646 1342 472  0.0820 
Sikkim 540493 597 2338 360  0.1098 
Tamil Nadu  62110839 1479 107273 464  3.6401 
Tripura 3191168 1072 6980 234  0.2762 
Uttar Pradesh  166052859 953 1338 899  0.1063 
Uttarakhand 8479562 439 0 1102  0.0514 












Appendix VII – Inverse of Asset Density 
  Inverse of asset density 
State Area education water roads  Index 
Andhra Pradesh  275,068 3.4 5.8 1.8 0.0004 
Arunachal 
Pradesh  83,743 42.6 160.1 5.0 0.0069 
Assam  78,483 2.0 17.8 1.1 0.0007 
Bihar  94,164 1.8 2.3 2.0 0.0002 
Chhattisgarh  135,194 2.9 446.2 0.6 0.0150 
Goa  3,702 3.4 15.6 0.4 0.0006 
Gujarat  196,024 4.5 338.6 3.1 0.0115 
Haryana  44,212 3.0 1.9 2.0 0.0002 
Himachal Pradesh  55,673 4.0 27.6 2.5 0.0011 
Jammu and 
Kashmir  222,236 13.0 59.1 19.4 0.0030 
Jharkhand  79,700 3.5 0.0 5.2 0.0003 
Karnataka 191791 3.3 223.8 1.6  0.0076 
Kerala  38,863 3.7 8.7 0.3 0.0004 
Madhya Pradesh  308,144 2.2 5.9 0.5 0.0003 
Maharashtra  307,713 4.2 444.0 1.0 0.0150 
Manipur  22,327 6.3 67.4 2.5 0.0025 
Meghalaya  22,429 2.8 27.4 3.7 0.0011 
Mizoram  21,081 8.1 265.8 6.0 0.0093 
Nagaland  16,579 7.9 24.8 0.9 0.0011 
Orissa  155,707 2.4 10.6 0.7 0.0005 
Punjab  50,362 3.1 0.7 1.1 0.0002 
Rajasthan  342,236 3.9 8.1 2.9 0.0005 
Sikkim  7,096 7.8 30.7 4.7 0.0014 
Tamil Nadu  130,058 3.1 224.6 1.0 0.0076 
Tripura  10,492 3.5 22.9 0.8 0.0009 
Uttar Pradesh  238,566 1.4 1.9 1.3 0.0002 
Uttaranchal  53,566 2.8 0.0 7.0 0.0003 











Appendix VIII – Calculation of Shares of each State in the local body grants 



























Andhra Pradesh  0.2249  0.0000 0.0126 3.4540 3.6915  5.7
Arunachal 
Pradesh 0.7778  0.0009 0.0113 0.1481 0.9380  1.5
Assam 0.7139  0.0001 0.0296 1.7604 2.5039  3.9
Bihar 0.4757  0.0000 0.0221 1.7020 2.1998  3.4
Chhattisgarh 0.5545  0.0019 0.2882 1.4296 2.2741  3.5
Goa 0.0519  0.0001 0.0293 0.0599 0.1413  0.2
Gujarat 0.1160  0.0014 0.3723 1.7186 2.2083  3.4
Haryana 0.1034  0.0000 0.0137 0.7506 0.8677  1.3
Himachal Pradesh  0.2560  0.0001 0.0155 0.5152 0.7869  1.2
Jammu and 
Kashmir 0.6464  0.0004 0.0173 0.8690 1.5331  2.4
Jharkhand 0.0992  0.0000 0.0123 0.3040 0.4155  0.6
Karnataka 0.2620  0.0010 0.2619 2.9968 3.5217  5.5
Kerala 0.2157  0.0001 0.0434 1.7594 2.0186  3.1
Madhya Pradesh  0.8846  0.0000 0.0071 6.0579 6.9495  10.8
Maharashtra 0.1799  0.0019 0.5885 5.4092 6.1794  9.6
Manipur 0.8140  0.0003 0.0340 0.2314 1.0796  1.7
Meghalaya 0.8307  0.0001 0.0146 0.2600 1.1054  1.7
Mizoram 0.6342  0.0012 0.0493 0.1280 0.8126  1.3
Nagaland 0.4535  0.0001 0.0168 0.1974 0.6679  1.0
Orissa 0.7838  0.0001 0.0135 2.9334 3.7306  5.8
Punjab 0.1394  0.0000 0.0098 0.8997 1.0489  1.6
Rajasthan 0.6344  0.0001 0.0103 4.6562 5.3009  8.2
Sikkim 0.7372  0.0002 0.0137 0.0773 0.8284  1.3
Tamil Nadu  0.1520  0.0010 0.4550 2.1631 2.7711  4.3
Tripura 0.6629  0.0001 0.0345 0.3734 1.0710  1.7
Uttar Pradesh  0.3897  0.0000 0.0133 7.1318 7.5348  11.7
Uttaranchal 0.0202  0.0000 0.0064 0.3697 0.3963  0.6
West Bengal  0.1098  0.0000 0.0237 1.6442 1.7777  2.8
 
 